The FBI Virtual Case File: A Case Study Marchewka
Communications of the IIMA © 2010 7 2010 Volume 10 Issue 2
In September 2003 the Government Accountability Office (formerly the U.S. General
Accounting Office) issued a report that warned that the FBI was exposing its modernization
efforts to undue risk because it was working without an enterprise architecture (Grimes, 2005).
According to Randolph C. Hite, who worked for the GAO, “It was a classic case of not getting
the requirements sufficiently defined in terms of completeness and correctness from the
beginning. And so it required a continuous redefinition of requirements that had a cascading
effect on what had already been designed and produced. Had there been an architecture, the
likelihood of these requirements problems would have been vastly diminished” (Goldstein,
2005).
The VCF project and problems continued as SAIC began testing the system in the fall of 2003.
In December, Zalmai Azmi was named the acting CIO for the FBI, and SAIC delivered the VCF
to the FBI. Azmi made the decision to reject delivery, and the FBI documented 17 functional
deficiencies that SAIC would have to fix before the system would be accepted. SAIC argued
that many of these deficiencies were requirements changes, so an arbitrator was called in. In
March 2004, the arbitrator released a report that found fault with both the FBI and SAIC.
According to the report, 59 issues and sub-issues were derived from the original 17 deficiencies
– 19 were due to requirements changes and the FBI’s fault, while the remaining 40 were SAIC
problems. SAIC offered to make all the changes if given one more year and $56 million. Azmi
rejected the offer (Goldstein, 2005).
Unfortunately, this did not seal the VCF project’s fate. SAIC continued to fix coding errors,
while Depew’s team developed investigative scenarios that could be tested on the system. In
fact, Mueller provided an optimistic testimony to a Senate subcommittee that VCF would be
operational by the summer of 2004. According to the Washington Post, Mueller testified that the
FBI experienced a delay with a contractor and that the problems had been solved. Moreover, he
expected that the VCF would be delivered by summer (Eggen & Witte, 2006).
In May 2004, Azmi was officially named the FBI’s CIO. In June, the FBI contracted with
Aerospace Corp. as an independent reviewer to assess whether the system requirements were
accurate and complete. In addition, Azmi requested SAIC to change an electronic workflow
function of the VCF system into something called the Initial Operating Capability (IOC) for a
fixed price of $16.4 million. The schedule would be six months and IOC would be delivered to
almost 500 field personnel in the New Orleans and Baton Rouge field offices, as well as a drug
enforcement unit in the Hoover Building. This also led to a change of managers as Rick
Reynolds at SAIC replaced Brice Zimmerman, while Depew left to become the director the
FBI’s New Jersey Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory. In addition, Sherry Higgins quit
her position at the FBI and moved back to Georgia before the IOC project was launched. In her
view, “When it’s not fun anymore, Sherry’s not a happy girl. The writing was on the wall that
IOC was going to be Zal’s project. And I just felt like it would be better for me and Zal for me
to leave” (Goldstein, 2005).
Unlike his three predecessors, Azmi was involved in the day-to-day operations of the new IOC
project. As of June 2004, SAIC had about 120 of its engineers working on the IOC project, but a
strict development schedule, acceptance criteria, a control mechanisms were put into place.